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THE LEGAL CRUSADES OF THE
SABBATARIANS
THE DECALOGUE
The Decalogue commands: "Remember the Sabbath
day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labor, and do all
thy work. But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord,
thy God; in it thou shalt not do any work."'
The injunction of the commandment is mandatory as
well as prohibitory. It directs the performance of work
'Exodus XXI, 8-10. The reason given for the observance of the
Sabbath is drawn from the creation, and agrees with Genesis. In
a parallel passage in Deuteronomy the command to obey the Sab-
bath is based on the memory of the bondage in Egypt. The original
commandment probably was, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it
holy." The reason given in Exodus is generally assumed to have
been annexed by a hand akin to Genesis. The reason given in Deuter-
onomy is rather a parenthetical addition, than an original element
which was omitted' in Exodus.
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on the six days as peremptorily as it does the abstention
from work on the seventh. And apparently the sinfulness
of a violation of the mandate is as great as that of an in-
fraction of the prohibition.*-' It is true that the command-
ment states that the seventh day was "blessed and hal-
lowed," and it seems that the other six days were neither
blessed nor hallowed, but both the phraseology and the
philosophy 'of the commandment justify the assumption
that the hallowing of the seventh day was as much attribut-
able to the work done on the six days at it was to the
resting on the seventh. It would indeed be remarkable, if
resting on the seventh day, after having rested on the pre-
vious six days, should result in the sanctification of the
seventh day.
Curiously enough, however, the efforts of those who
endeavor to bring about social or moral reforms through
the agency of the criminal law have been confined to the
negative part of the commandment. Little has been accomp-
lished or attempted toward giving a legal sanction to the
direction, "Six days shalt thou labor." Vagrancy laws, it
is true, have been enacted in most jurisdictions, but their
enactment has been motivated by economic rather than
ethical or moral considerations.3
The commandment was addressed to the Jewish nation
alone. It was intended to apply only to the Jews.' It
therefore does not apply to Christians. The Decalogue
itself proves this, for it begins, "I am the Lord, thy God,
which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out
of the house of bondage," and many other passages of the
2The contrary is vigorously asserted in C. v. Specht 8 Pa.312;
C. v. Wolf 3 S. & R. 48.
339 Cyc. 1111; 8 R. C. L. 339. For the Pennsylvania statutes, see
West Penna. Statutes of 1920, sec. 21409 et seq. There seems to be a
conflict of opinion as to whether vagrancy was an offense at common
law, 29 A. & C. Encyc. 569.
437 Cyc. 539; Spurhawk v. C. 54 Pa. 401.
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Old Testament confirm this view. Indeed, it has been
judiciously stated that "a recapitulation of the Scripture
makes it clear that the fourth commandment, which is a
positive statute imposed upon the Israelites alone, as a
people separated from all other nations by the Almighty for
special and wise purposes, was not intended for the Gentiles
or those living under a later dispensation."5
There is nothing in the New Testament prescribing
the observance of the Sabbath or Sunday. Jesus did not
command its observance; and in his reply to the young
man whom he directed to keep the commandments, if he
would enter eternal life, and who asked him, "Which?"
Jesus did not mention the fourth commandment. The
Apostles who enforce and, as it were, reenact every other
commandment, never advert to the fourth. And many
texts from the New Testament show that the fourth com-
mandment was regarded as merely a ceremonial or judicial
law, which was abrogated and abolished by the coming
of Jesus and the completion of the Christian dispensation.
Some very famous and zealous Christians have been
intransigeantly insistent upon this point. Luther, with
characteristic aggressiveness, declared, "If anywhere one
sets up its observance upon a Jewish foundation, then I
order him to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast
on it, to do anything that will remove this encroachment
on the Christian spirit and liberty." Calvin called it "a
shadowy commandment which was abolished at the advent
of Christ," and encouraged the burghers at Geneva by his
presence and example at their public recreations, such as
shooting and bowling, upon the Lord's day after their
devotions at church were ended. Penn, our own great law
giver, declared, "To call any day of the week a Christian
Sabbath is not Christian but Jewish; give us one Scripture
for it; I will give you two against it."
5Sparhawk v. Union Pas. Co. 54 Pa. 401.
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The commandment enjoins abstention from work on
the "seventh day," which is "the Sabbath." This day is
now known as Saturday. The Sunday of the Christian
world is not therefore the Sabbath of the Decalogue. It is
not even the successor of the Sabbath of the Decalogue.
The commandment does not therefore either expressly or
impliedly forbid the performance of work on Sunday.'
In spite of all this, however, Sunday is among the first
and most sacred institutions of the Christian religion, and
most people think that its sanctity is prescribed to all
nations, and particularly to Christians by the fourth com-
mandment.'
THE COMMON LAW
It has been frequently stated that Christianity is a
part of the common law of Pennsylvania. "Christianity,
general Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the
common law of Pennsylvania. Christianity without the
spiritual artillery of European countries; not Christianity
founded on any particular religious tenets; not Christianity
with an established church and tithes, and spiritual courts;
but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all."8
Since Sunday is the "holy day among Christians," and
its observance is "one of the bulwarks of Christianity,"
and Christianity is a part of the common law, it would seem
that the sanctity of Sunday should be protected by the
common law. "If Christianity is a part of the common
637 Cyc. 539; Sparhawk v. Union Pas. Co. 54 Pa. 401.
737 Cyc. 539; Sharhawk v. Union Pas. Co. 54 Pa. 401. "Observ-
ance of Sunday is one of the bulwarks of Christianity." Johnson
v. C. 22 Pa. 102. "Sunday is the holy day among Christians." C. v.
American Baseball Club, 290 Pa. 136.
8Sparhawk v. Union R R_ Co. 54 Pa. 401. For a recent statement
to the same effect, see C. v. American Baseball Co. 290 Pa. 136. That
such a statement should be made at the present time is indeed
surprising.
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law, it carries with it a civil obligation to abstain on the
Lord's day from all worldly labor and business, except
works of charity and necessity. Christianity without a
Sabbath would be no Christianity."
Such, however, is not the case. The common law does
not forbid work or labor on Sunday, and, according to it,
contracts made on Sunday are valid."" The fact that the
common law did not attempt to prevent the profanation of
Sunday proves that the statement that Christianity is a
part of the common law "is really not law; it is rhetoric.""
LEGISLATION
Sunday legislation is more than fifteen centuries old.
It originated in Rome in A. D. 321, when Constantine the
Great passed an edict commanding all judges and inhabi-
tants of cities to rest on the venerable day of the sun. The
day was to be venerated as a religious duty owed to the
God of the Sun. "All Sunday legislation is the product of
pagan Rome; the Saxon laws were the product of the
Middle Age legislation of the Holy Roman Empire; the
English laws are an expansion of the Saxon; and the
American are the transcript of the English.1
12
ENGLISH STATUTES
Sunday statutes were passed at an early date in Eng-
land. The earlier statutes were directed against fairs,
amusements, and travellers of certain kinds. 13 These were
followed by the important statute of 29 Car. II. C. 7. The
9Sparhawk v. Union R. R. 54 Pa. 401, per Strong, J.
1027 A. & E. Encyc. 388; Kepner v. Keefer 6 Watts 231, correct-
ing a mistake in Morgan v. Richards 1 Browne 171. Judicial pro-
ceedings only were prohibited on Sunday, Rheim v. Bank 76 Pa. 132.
"In Re Bowman (1917) A. C. 406.
'2C. v. Hoover 25 Super. Ct. 134.
1128 A. & E. Encyc. 390; 37 Cyc. 540; C. v. Hoover 25 Super.
Ct. 134.
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main provision of this statute was that no tradesman,
artificer, workman, laborer, or other person whatsoever
should do or exercise any worldly labor, business, or work
of their ordinary calling upon the Lord's day, or any part
thereof; works of necessity or charity alone excepted."
AMERICAN STATUTES
Sunday laws, or "laws for the better observance of
the Lord's day," as they were generally called, were passed
in most of the colonies."5 The earliest one was passed by
the colony of Virginia in 1617, three years before the
Pilgrims landed at Plymouth.18 Sunday laws exist in prac-
tically all of the states. 7 The English statute of 29 Charles
II has been made the basis of this legislation."" In many
states it has been substantially adopted. In others the
Sunday laws are more comprehensive altho it has been fol-
lowed in part.19
PENNSYLVANIA STATUTES
Penn's views on the subject of Sunday are set forth
in his works and those of Barclay. They were the views
of the Society of Friends, who were the settlers of Penn-
sylvania. These views found expression in the laws agreed
upon in England on May 5th, 1682. The thirty-sixth law
provided: "That according to the good example of primi-
tive Christians, and for the ease of creation, every first
day of the week, called Sunday, people shall abstain from
their common daily labor, that they may better dispose
1428 A. & E. Encyc. 390. This statute is said to be still in force.
1"28 A. & E. Encyc. 390.
1610 Va. Law Reg. 64.
1728 A. & E. Encyc. 390.
1837 Cyc. 540.
19Kepner v. Keefer 6 Watts 233; 27 A. & E. Encyc. 390. The
statute of 29 Charles II. furnished the model for statutes passed in
Pennsylvania in 1682, 1700, and 1705. C. v. Nesbit 34 Pa. 401.
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themselves to worship God according to their understand-
ing."2
0
The very first law of the first General Assembly of
Pennsylvania related to this subject. It was part of the
Great Law passed at Chester on December 7th, 1682. It
declared that "people shall abstain from their usual and
common toil and labor" on Sunday that * * * "they may
better dispose themselves to read the scripture of truth
at home or to frequent such meetings of religious wor-
ship as may best suit their respective persuasions."
2 1
The act of 1682 provided no penalty for its violation.
It was corrected by an act passed in 1705, which in other
respects reenacted the law of 1682.22 A more elaborate
act, in nearly the same language, was passed in 1705, and
was allowed to become law by lapse of time in accordance
with the proprietary charter, having been considered by
the Queen in Council and not acted upon.2"
The act of 1705 remained the law until March 30th,
1779, when it was repealed by an act passed for the "sup-
pression of vice and immorality." The second section of
this act provided: "That if any person shall do any work
of his or her ordinary calling, or follow or do any worldly
employment or business whatsoever on Lord's Day, com-
monly called Sunday, (works of necessity and mercy alone
excepted)" he should be fined.2 4
The act of 1779 seems not to have been enforced; and
the fine provided for by it, being payable in depreciated
currency, having become less than a shilling in specie
20 C. v. Nesbit 34 Pa. 40t; C. v. Hoover 25 Super Ct. 139.
21C. v. Nesbit 34 Pa. 401; C. v. Hoover 25 Super. Ct. 139.
22Statutes at Large, p., 4. This act was repealed by the Queen
in Council on February 7th, 1705. 2 Statutes at Large, p., 4.
232 Statutes at Large, p., 177. These reenactments were doubtless
rendered necessary by repeals of the colonial laws by the Privy
Council of England.
249 Statutes at Large, p., 333.
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currency, another act was passed on September 25th, 1786,
which repealed the act of 1779 and prohibited under a
penalty any person "doing or performing any worldly
employment or business whatever on Lord's Day, com-
monly called Sunday (works of necessity and charity only
excepted). "5
Finally the act of April 22nd, 1794, was passed in the
year after the yellow fever devastated Philadelphia, when
the scourge was widely regarded as a punishment inflicted
upon the community because of increasing levity and
worldliness. It repealed the act of 1786, which was "soon
to expire by its own limitation." It provides that "if any
person shall do or perform any worldly employment or
business whatsoever on the Lord's Day, commonly called
Sunday, works of necessity and charity only excepted,
every such person, so offending shall for such offense for-
feit and pay four dollars * * * or in case he or she shall
refuse or neglect to pay the said sum, he or she shall
suffer six days imprisonment * * * "26
The statute of Charles II and the earlier Pennsylvania
statutes which followed it prohibited employment or busi-
ness in one's ordinary calling. 27 The act of 1794 prohibits
"any" worldly employment or business and enumerates
exceptions. The legislature purposely made this change
in the wording of the act. "They saw that the blacksmith
might leave his shop and work on Sunday at making
garden and building fences as it was not his ordinary
calling. They forbade "any worldly business or employ-
ment whatsoever." "Under the present statute it matters
not whether it is the person's ordinary calling or business
or not.12 8
2512 Statutes at Large, p., 313.
2615 Statutes at Large 110. For review of Pa. statutes see Weed-
man v. Marsh 4 Cl. 401.
"127 A. & E. Encyc. 396; Acts of 1682, 1700, and 1705.
28sC. v. Hoover 25 Super. Ct. 139.
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CONSTITUTIONALITY
The decision that the Sunday law was constitutional
was a great victory for the Sabbatarians, but it was won
by firing masked batteries. The constitutionality was
attacked on the ground that it violated the guaranty of
religious freedom. 29 It was argued that the law was uncon-
stitutional because it attempted to exalt by law the re-
ligious beliefs of certain sects over that of others; because
it controlled religious observance and interfered with the
consciences of those who honestly disbelieved the asserted
sanctity of the selected day; and because it gave a prefer-
ence to a religious establishment or mode of worship.
The law was held to be constitutional because it was
essentially a civil and not a religious regulation "whose
validity was neither strengthened or weakened by the fact
that the day of rest it enjoined was Sunday." Experience,
the court said, had proven that one day ought to be set
aside and enforced as a day of rest in every country and
the first day of the week was chosen not because it was
the Christian Sabbath but because it was already observed
by a great majority of the people and therefore was the most
convenient day to adopt. "The selection of the day of rest
was a question of expediency and if, the choice falling on
the first day of the week, the Jew and Seventh Day Ad-
ventists suffer the inconvenience of two successive days of
withdrawal from worldly affairs, it was an incidental
worldly disadvantage, temporarily injurious, it may be, to
them, but conferring no superior religious position upon
those who chose to worship upon the first day of the week.
The law intends no preference.""0
29Sec. 3, of the Bill of rights of 1790. This provision remains
unaltered at the present time. Art. I, sec. 3, Constitution of 1874.
See also Art. IX, sec. 4, Constitution of 1838.
3 0Specht v. C. 8 Pa. 312. To same effect, see C. v. Wolf 3
S. & R. 48.
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The motive of those who enacted the Sunday law
was unquestionably to prohibit the profanation of a day
regarded by them as sacred, and even if this were not the
motive, the effect of law was to give a preference to one
religious sect over others. The law was passed in pursu-
ance of the idea that Christianity should be specially fa-
vored by law. Its purpose was to protect the Christian
Sunday from desecration and it favors the Christian re-
ligion to the exclusion of others.3 1
The decision, however, was in accord with the de-
cisions of other jurisdictions and the question has not been
reopened.2
CONSTRUCTION
The law provides that any person who shall do or
perform any worldly employment on Sunday and who shall
"be convicted thereof * * * shall for such offense forfeit
and pay four dollars." The prohibition of worldly busi-
ness and employment is implied from the imposition of the
penalty."3
The general rule is that where the legislature imposes a
pecuniary penalty for the violation of a statute, the pay-
ment of the penalty may be enforced by a criminal prosecu-
tion or a civil action. 4 The Pennsylvania law has not been
so construed. It is held that the "act considers a breach of
the Sabbath as injurious to society; terms the complaint an
lThe Pennsylvania statute was modeled to some extent after
the statute of Charles II, which is frankly admitted by English judges
to have been passeed in the interest of Christianity. Tennell v.
Ridler 5 B. & C. 406.
32The statute does not violate the guaranty of jury trial. C. v.
Waldman 140 Pa. 89. Nor the provision concerning the title of
statute. C. v. Rapp 23 D. R. 144. It is not unconstitutional because
of uncertainty. C. v. American Baseball Club 290 Pa. 133.
-
3C. v. Jeandell 2 Gr. 506.
34U. S. v. Stevenson 215 U. S. 190; Kepner v. U. S. 213 U. S. 103.
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accusation; calls the establishment of the truth of the
offense charged a conviction; and that therefore the penalty
cannot be recovered in a civil action.3 5 A violation is a
crime."3 6
The fact that a violation of the statute is a crime has
probably increased the deterrent effect of the act in cases
to which it is applicable. Doubtless there are persons who
would not hesitate to do acts which are morally repre-
hensible and socially injurious, and who would with equan-
imity contemplate a civil verdict against them, but are
loath to suffer a criminal conviction and the stigma which
society has attached to it.
The decision has, however, decreased the efficacy of
the statute by decreasing the scope of its application. Be-
cause a violation of the law is a crime, it has frequently
been construed in accordance with the orthadox but inde-
fensible rule that criminal statutes are to be construed
strictly.3 7
It was at first held that a person might be convicted
for every violation of the Sabbath committed by him even,
tho occurring on the same day, unless his conduct con-
stituted one continuous transaction.-8 Otherwise, it was
said, a person by paying the penalty of four dollars might
"buy the privilege of breaking the Sabbath at his will and
pleasure." "If such was the law, a man without conscience
or who conscientiously believed that a different day should
be kept, would make money by thus offending. A Jew
or Seventh day Baptist might keep his store or shop open on
Sunday when all others are closed and thus do a vast deal
35C. v, Wolf 3 S. & R. 48.
36C. v. Fineberg 22 D. R. 17; C. v. Shepley 18 D. R. 133; C. v.
Eyre 1 S. & R. 347; C. v. Foster 28 Super. 400; C. v. Jeandell 2 Gr. 506.
3737 Cyc. 543. There are authorities contra. 37 Cyc. 543. The
exceptions of charity and necessity of late years are very liberally
construed.
3
"Duncan v. C. 2 Pearson 213; Reiff v. C. 1 Mont. 28.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
more business than on any other day in the week, the
profit of which would amply repay him the fine."3 9
This view did not long prevail. It was later held that
there can be but one violation by the same person on the
same day, and consequently there can be but one fine im-
posed for that violation.40 This rule has given rise to the
very evils which the earlier cases predicted would follow
if it were adopted.
In construing the statute the courts have had regard
for changing conditions and have "expressed the fear that
too literal an interpretation and enforcement may create
an antagonism that may lead to its repeal or serious modi-
fication.41
SANCTION
The sanction of the statute is a penalty of four dollars.
This soon proved to be inadequate to effectuate the purpose
for which the statute was passed. It was "but light; far too
light indeed to prevent the violation of the statute by our
great corporations and capitalists who regard their own
profit rather than the public welfare. 42 The courts have
vigorously disavowed ability or desire to increase the
severity of the sanction. The correction of this defect,
they have said, was "not within the province of the courts
whose duty it was simply to enforce the act as they found
it. 1" 3 "If the penalty therein provided is not a sufficient
deterrent, it is for the legislature to provide another." 44
39Duncan v. C. 2 Pearson 213.
40Friedeborn v. C. 113 Pa. 243; 25 R. C. L. 1456.
41C. v. Matthews 152 Pa. 166.
42Friedeborn v. C. 113 Pa. 242.
43Friedeborn v. C. 113 Pa. 242.
44C. v. Smith 266 Pa. 511. See also Steckler v. Hough 1 Pitts.
240; C. v. Hoover 25 Super. 139; C. v. Fineberg 22 D. R. 17; C. v.
Smith 43 C. C. 93.
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Efforts have nevertheless -been frequently made to
have the courts increase the severity of the sanction of
the statute and some of these efforts have been remarkably
successful.
CONTRACTS
In construing the statute the courts have held that it
makes criminal the making of "contracts" on Sunday, be-
cause the making of contracts is worldly business and em-
ployment; and from the criminality of the making of such
"contracts" the courts have derived the voidness of such
"contracts." They have accordingly announced hat not
only will they not aid in the enforcement of such promises
if executory, but that they will not aid the parties to
recover what they have paid or sold in pursuance of such
promises. They have thus increased the penalty for this
crime out of all ratio to the turpitude of the acts committed
in those cases in which the violation of the statute consists
of the making of a contract.45 Previous to the statutes the
common law authorized Sunday contracts. The legislature
withdrew this authorization and provided a specific penalty.
The courts then, as an independent prohibiting authority,
issued another prohibition with an entirely dissimilar and
much more severe penalty.
TORTS
An effort was made to have the courts, thru the
instrumentality of the law of torts, increase still further
the penalty provided by law for a violation of the statute.
The courts were asked to hold, in accordance with the
general principle that no man shall be allowed to found a
legal claim upon his own illegal act, that no liability
attached for injuries received by a person while violating
4517 Dickinson Law Review, p. 155; 31 Dickinson Law Review,
p. 189.
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the Sunday law, as his own illegal act necessarily con-
tributed to his injury.4 6
Whenever one does an act on Sunday which is for-
bidden by law, and it appears that but for such act the
defendant's wrongful conduct would not have injured the
actor, the act is a contributing factor to the injury.
Whether it shall be viewed as a sufficiently substantial
factor to defeat the plaintiff's recovery for damages is a
question of public policy. The courts of Pennsylvania have
held that it is not as "such violation -is not the efficient
or proximate cause of the injury and as the time when the
injury is received is only an incident and not the founda-
tion of the action.."47
Efforts have also been made to have the courts hold
that a person engaged in a violation of the Sunday law is
liable for injuries inflicted by him without other fault or
negligence on his part. It was contended that when certain
conduct has been made criminal by statute it is because
that -conduct has been found injurious or dangerous to
society, and that the average careful man would not so
conduct himself, and that one who does so is, therefore,
negligent. The courts have refused to adopt this reasoning
where the defendant's misconduct was a violation of the
Sunday law. 48
BREACH OF THE PEACE
A person may be guilty of violating the Sunday law
although his conduct does not cause noise, annoyance to
neighbors, breach of the peace, or interference with re-
ligious worship." "It certainly cannot be contended, there-
46In some states it has been so held. 37 Cyc. 373.
4 7 Mohney v. Cook, 22 Pa. 342; Prollett v. Summers 106 Pa. 95;
Stuckler v. Haugh 1 Pitts. 239.
48Temple v. Chicago R. R. Co. 60 Qa. 331, 14 N. W. 320.
49C. v. American Baseball Club 290 Pa. 136.
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fore, that every violation of the statute is a breach of the
peace. Work noiselessly and quietly done may disturb no
one, and still the performer of it, if proceeded against
may have to pay the penalty, but would be answerable no
further.50
But "if worldly business or employment be of such a
character as to disturb the quiet of the neighborhood, or
of an individual neighbor, or be carried on in the vicinity of
a place of worship so as to disturb those assembled for
public worship," it is a common law misdemeanor-a breach
of the peace, for which the offender may be indicted, and
arrested and held for good behavior in the meantime.51
The reason for this rule is said to be that such oc-
currences may not be prevented otherwise than by treating
them as breaches of the peace. "If no arrests can be made
tor the disturbance, incident to or caused by the worldly
pursuits of individuals, then it will follow that whenever
it is more profitable to carry on business by paying the
penalty than to abstain from it, there will be found persons
in the community ready publicly, and without regard to the
peace of society to engage in it. In short four dollars will
be a license fee for the right to carry on the most noisy
employments, it may be, in the most public places on the
Sabbath, instead of a penalty to secure its observance." 2
The rule is not applicable, it is said, where there is a
mere "disturbance of the conscience "-"a constructive dis-
turbance." There must be an "actual" disturbance "occur-
ring so long or so frequently and in such a place as to
amount to a public disturbance.""s
But the statute has established what may be called
the "Peace of the Sabbath," to break which is a common
5OC. v. Jeandell 2 Grant 506.
51C. v. Leaman 1 Phila. 46; C. v. Jeandell 2 Gr. 506. "A breach
of the peace is a common law offense." 9 C. J. 387.
52C. v. Jeandell 2 Grant 506.
53C. v. Jeandell 2 Grant 506.
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law misdemeanor. 4 Business which may be carried on
during week days without being the subject of complaint
may become a breach of the peace on Sunday if it disturb
persons in the enjoyment of the "rest" of that day.55
The rule does not conflict with the statute which pro-
vides that when a statute enjoins anything to be done in a
particular way, or affixes a penalty to the doing of an act,
the remedy of the statute shall be followed and no other. 6
The penalty imposed by the Sunday law is for the perform-
ance of worldly employment-a punishment for the act.
The breach of the peace is a different offense of which the
worldly employment and the manner and kind of it is only
evidence. It is not covered by the Sunday law. 57
Since a violation of the Sunday law is not itself a
breach of the peace, there can be no arrest for it on view
without warrant. The effect of this may be that "persons
from other states may violate the Sunday law with im-
punity, as it is generally understood that offenses of this
character are not among those for which governors of
states well honor requisitions."58
GOOD BEHAVIOR
A statute was passed in England in 1.360 authorizing
justices of the peace "to take of them that be not of good
fame where they shall be found, sufficient surety and main
prize of their good behavior toward the king and his
people."59 This statute is in force in Pennsylvania.6 °
"The natural meaning of the words 'persons not of
good fame' seems to be those who by their general evil
rC. v. Jeandell 2 Grant 506.
5C. v. Leaman I Phila. 460.
5 3Sec. 183, Act of March 31, 1860 which reenacted the Act of 1806.
5"C. v. Jeandell 2 Grant 506.
58C. v. Smith 43 C. C. 93.
5034 Ed. III Cap. 1.
O0 Robert's Dig. Brit. Stat. 339.
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course and habits of life had acquired a bad reputation and
were supposed to be dangerous to the community. In
process of time, however, the construction of these ex-
pressions has been extended far beyond their original mean-
ing, and persons are now commonly held to find surety for
their good behavior who are not generally of ill fame but
have only been charged with some particular offense."'"
It has been held that the courts have no authority
under this statute to require a person to give security to
be of good behavior, who has several times been convicted
of violating the Sunday law, in absence of any allegation or
evidence that such violation was such as to disturb the
peace or constitute a public nuisance.6 2
It was contended that one who repeatedly violated the
Sunday law and upon each occasion paid the penalty, was
"offensive to the moral and religious sense of the com-
munity as well as an insult to the law, and so came within
the class of those whom it is the duty of the court to bold
for good behavior."
The court, however, said, "The record contains nothing
from which it could be inferred that there was any reason-
able ground to apprehend that this defendant would com-
mit any felony or misdemeanor, or disturb the peace, or in
any way trouble, disturb or injure any of the people of
the state, in their persons or property. The complaint
which was at the foundation of the proceedings discloses
that the purpose for which it was instituted was entirely
foreign to that of the statute. If the fear that the violation
of a mere police regulation, which involves no annoylance
or danger to persons or property nor infraction of public
peace nor the commission of a felony or misdemeanor, is
such a menace to public welfare as to make it the duty of
61C. v. Duane I Binney 97; C. v. Jeandell 3 -Phila. 509. Surety
for good behavior is more extensive than surety of the peace and
may be more easily forfeited. C. v. Duane 1 Binney 99.
12C. v. Foster 28 Super. 400.
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the court to require him to give security of good behavior,
it would seem to necessarily follow that a subsequent viola-
tion of the same police regulation would work a forfeiture
of the bond. This would result in vesting in the courts
the power to increase the penalty fixed for the violation
by the law making authority which created the regula-
tion.1
CONSPIRACY
The crime of conspiracy is a signal illustration of the
philosophy of evolution as applied to the criminal law. It
did not originate as a general offense at common law, but
in a series of statutes, dating from the time of Edward I,
enacted to remedy a specific abuse in a criminal proceedure.
These statutes make clear how narrow and restricted was
the early crime of conspiracy. It admitted of no broad
common law generalizations; it was limited to the precise
and definite language of the statutes. Only combinations to
procure false indictments, or to bring false appeals, or to
maintain vexatious suits, could constitute conspiracies. In
the course of six centuries the crime has developed into
a most comprehensive and elastic common law crime, which
is vague in its outlines and uncertain in its fundamental
nature, by means of which judges are enabled to enforce
their own individual notions of justice and punish by crim-
inal process such concerted conduct as seemed to them
socially oppressive or undesirable. 64
The crime is now usually defined as an agreement be-
tween two or more persons to do an unlawful act. The
meaning of the term "unlawful act" as used in this defini-
tion is unique and has never been precisely defined. It has
63C. v. Foster.28 Super. 400.
64
"The law of conspiracy is in a very unsettled state. The de-
cisions have gone.on no distinctive principle; nor are they always con.
sistent." Gibson, C. J., in Mifflin v. C. 5 W. & S. 461.
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been said to include all crimes, whether common law or
statutory, felony or misdemeanor, mala in se or mala
prohibita.65
Since a violation of the Sunday law is a crime, it would
seem to follow that an agreement to violate it is a criminal
conspiracy. A very important and numerous class of Sun-
day law violations, sales, are predicated upon agreement, and
it would seem to follow that the crime of conspiracy would
be a convenient vehicle by which to increase the penalty for
Sunday law violations.
Such is not the case. A sale on Sunday is not a crim-
inal conspiracy, because of the qualifying principle that an
agreement to commit a crime which can only be com-
mitted by the joint action of the two persons to the agree-
ment is not a criminal conspiracy.66
It is; however, a crime to conspire "to obstruct and
defeat the Sunday law." "If the defendant was properly
convicted as we think he was, we have nothing to do with
the effect of that conviction, even if it was an efficient and
effective means of keeping his store closed or, as the appel-
lant puts it, of increasing the penalty for Sunday labor.
He was not indicted for Sunday labor, but for a conspiracy
to defeat and obstruct the laws relating to Sunday, which
is a very different thing. ''6 7
COSTS
Attempts have been made to increase the effecacy of
the Sunday law by multiplying costs. It became the prac-
66C. v. Hazen 23 Pa. 363.
66C. v. Bricker 74 Super. 234. "Where concert is a constituent
part of a criminal act, such concert is not indictable as a conspiracy
to commit the act." Shannon v. C. 14 Pa. 226. A purchaser on Sun-
day is not particeps criminis. C. v. Hoover 25 Super. 133. It would
seem to follow that a sale on Sunday does not invoke a criminal
conspiracy.
67C. v. Bontos 35 Super. 102.
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tice where more than one person was engaged in the viola-
tion to prosecute each person separately and assess costs
against each. It was finally held that this was not legal,
as, under the act of March 10th, 1905, there could be only
one complaint and one bill of costs where the criminal
acts grew out of the same transaction. 68
INJUNCTION
In the early period of its history the court of chancery
exercised criminal jurisdiction to repress violence and re-
strain the lawlessness of the great against the poor and
helpless. 69 But the exercise of this prerogative power grew
less frequent with advancing civilization as the ordinary
remedies became more effective and acts of violence and
lawlessness less common. 0
It is now generally asserted that, except where there is
express statutory authority therefor, equity has no crim-
inal jurisdiction, and that acts or omissions will not be
enjoined merely on the ground that they are crimes.71
This is the rule tho the officers whose duty it is to enforce
the criminal law neglect or refuse to perform their duty.72
The fact that the punishment provided by law for the crime
is inadequate does not change the rule.73
The advantages of securing from equity injunctions
against crime are very great. The prohibitions of the crim-
inal law are general and each man is left to apply it to
himself. The prohibition of an injunction is addressed
directly to an individual. The punishments for crime are
68C. v. Fineberg 22 D. R. 17; C. v. Shipley 18 D. R. 133; Lewis
v. C. 3 D. & C. 551; C. v. Pfahler 44 C. C. 5.
6932 C. J. 275.
7032 C. J. 275; 31 Dickinson Law Review 195.
7132 C. J. 275; C. v. Smith 266 Pa. 511. For a case of express
statutory authority, see C. v. Henderson 31 Super. 383.
7232 C. J. 276.
7332 C. J. 276.
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generally fixed by law. The punishment for disobedience
to an injunction is in the discretion of the court. For a
violation of the criminal law, punishment is imposed only
after plenary proceedings. The charge of violating an in-
junction is disposed of in a summary proceeding. By the
device of having a court determine the particular acts which
constitute the offense, and having the person likely to com-
mit the offense enjoined, the charge of subsequent guilt
may be disposed of summarily, without preliminary hear-
ing, indictment by grand jury, or trial by jury. These ad-
vantages have led to a gradual, but persistent and con-
tinual enlargement of the power of the courts of equity
to grant injunctions and to a movement to extend this most
effective of the preventitive remedies developed in the past
on the civil side of the law.
The Pennsylvania courts have, however, uniformly
refused to enjoin acts merely because they were violations
of the Sunday law. "They have refused to do so at the
suit of an individual or the Commonwealth and whether
the injunction was sought against a private person or a
corporation."' That equity can restrain such violations is
unsupported by reason or any known authority. For what
was made an offense by the act it provides a penalty. The
remedy is to be found in the act. If the penalty therein
provided is not a sufficient deterrent, it is for the legisla-
ture to provide another."' 5
It is well settled, however, that where an injunction is
otherwise warranted by the principles of equity to protect
the rights of another, the mere fact that a criminal act
must be enjoined as incidental to such protection will not
deprive the court of its jurisdiction. The power of the
court to enjoin acts threatening irreparable injury cannot
'4C. v. Smith 266 Pa. 511; Sparkawk v. Union Pas. R. R. Co. 54
Pa. 401.
75C. v. Smith 290 Pa. 511.
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be divested because the act happens to be a violation of
the criminal law. The criminality of the act neither gives
nor divests jurisdiction. This distinction has been adopted
in reference to enjoining acts in violation of the Sunday
law. 6 Furthermore, if a particular violation amounts to
a public nuisance, it may be enjoined at the suit of the
Commonwealth.
QUO WARRANTO
The latest device for increasing the severity of the
sanction is quo warranto. It has been held that in quo
warranto proceedings, brought by the Commonwealth,
a decree may be rendered restraining a corporation from
violating the Sunday law.78 "It has been our policy from
an early date not to limit the use of the quo warranto
proceedings. There can be no doubt that a corporation
may be proceeded against by quo warranto for a misuse or
perversion of the franchise conferred upon it by the state
notwithstanding its officers and agents may at the same
time be amenable to the criminal law."
Quo warranto proceedings are so ancient that their
original character is a matter of conjecture.7 9 It is now
generally held that they may be used to prevent corpora-
tions from committing criminal acts, tho this is a widened
and historically incorrect use which can be justified only
as a matter of practical necessity, and is within the discre-
tion of the court.80
76Sparkawk v. Union R. R. 54 Pa. 401.
77C. v. Smith 290 Pa. 511.
78C. v. American Baseball Club 290 Pa. 139. The Penna. statute
authorizes the issuance of an injunction in such proceedings. Obedi-
ence to this injunction may be compelled in like manner as in other
cases of injunction. Penna. Statutes (West) 1920, sec. 18, 364.
7941 Harvard Law Review 244; 32 Cyc. 1413.
8037 Yale Law Journal 245; 41 Har. Law Rev. 247.
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Quo warranto should be used for this purpose only
"'where the offense is serious and the existing penalty not
a sufficient deterrent.""'
The Pennsylvania court found that where the viola-
tion consisted of playing professional baseball, the public
interest and lack of another adequate remedy necessary
to the maintenance of the action were present, and disre-
garded objections based on the historical nature of the
action. "It is doubtful whether other jurisdictions would
consider playing professional baseball on Sunday so ob-
jectionable as to warrant proceedings in quo warranto."' s
CONCLUSION
A crusade is defined as any concerted movement, vigor-
ously prosecuted, in behalf of an idea or principle or in the
interest of reform. The word has sometimes a connotation
of futility. A Sabbatarian is defined as a Christian who
observes Sunday with strictness, regarding the fourth com-
mandment as applicable to its observance. The term is
often used as one of reproach to indicate a bigoted or over-
strict observer. This article, we hope, has made the impli-
cations of its title sufficiently obvious.
WALTER HARRISON HITCHLER
8137 Yale Law J. 245. "Only-when there is such a serious abuse that
dissolution or substantial limitation is necessary." 41 Har. Law
Rev. 248.
8237 Yale Law J. 245.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. CONNELL
Summary Proceedings-No Payment of Costs on Acquittal
-Pecuniary Interests-Not Due Process
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Connell was arrested by a state patrolman for reckleess driving.
He was tried before a Justice of Peace of Pennsburg, a borough in a
county with a population of 50,000. He was found guilty and sent-
enced to pay fine and costs. He appealed to Court of Quarter
Sessions on ground of lack of due process because of pecuniary
interest of J. of P. Court of Quarter Sessions dismissed appeal, and
Connell appeals to this court.
Goodman, for Commonwealth.
Carpenter, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Schwartz, J. Appeal is taken by defendant on ground of pecuni-
ary interest of Justice of the Peace. A careful survey of the qustion
failed to disclose any cases on point in this jurisdiction. What was
the pecuniary interest of the Justice of the Peace? Both counsels
assume it to be the interest of the Justice of the Peace to get the
costs. If this is the pecuniary interest referred to we think that the
contentions of the defendant should be sustained. A direct pecuniary
interest of a judge in the outcome of a case disqualifies him and
makes him an improper person to try that case. Northampton v.
Smith, 11 Met. (Mass.) 390; State v. Winger, 37 Ohio 153. Did the
Justice of the Peace have a direct pecuniary interest? If the de-
fendant was fined, the Justice of the Peace got costs; if not, he did
not get anything. Can we, in view of that, say that the Justice of
the Peace didn't have a pecuniary interest when his own decision
would determine whether or not he is to receive a certain sum of
money? And if the costs, instead of being paid directly to the
Justice of the Peace, were paid to the State and out of that the
Justice of the Peace received the costs; the same pecuniary interest
of the Justice of the Peace would disqualify him. The only difference
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
would be as to the directness of the interest but in the end it would
all depend upon the decision of the Justice of the Peace.
Further, any Act of the Legislature which gives to the Justice
of the Peace the right to try cases and provides for him to receive
costs directly or indirectly is unconstitutional because it deprives the
defendant of his property, to wit, money, without due process of law.
The rule of law that no man can be judge in a case in which
he is interested is plainly founded in human nature and so firmly
established in the immutable principles of justice that it must be re-
garded as a fundamental rule of judicial conduct. Justice cannot, in
any proper sense, be judically administered by any man, however
well disposed he may be, if his decision is preconceived because of
his interest in the case.
If the interest of the Justice of the Peace, referred to in this case,
is not costs but something else, for example, that he would have to
pay the fine for the defendant because of some relationship as master
and servant, father and son, partners, or guardian and ward, etc., he
would be disqualified because of his pecuniary interest. 2 C. C. 642;
2 C. C. 134.
In the court of Common Pleas, there are two grounds for change
of venue; close relationship of the parties and a pecuniary interest
of the judge. By analogy we can see that the same ought to apply
to the courts of the Justice of the Peace. We therefore reverse the
decision of the Court of Quarter Sessions.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The defense offered is that the defendant has been denied due
process of law because his case was heard by a Justice of the Peace
who was pecuniarily interested in the case. The defendant claims
that the failure of the Justice to receive his costs when the defendant
is acquitted, and his receipt of them when the defendant is con-
victed, is a potent and direct incentive to find all guilty. This raises
the incidental questions; does the Justice receive costs on conviction;
does he not receive costs on acquittal. The case of Commonwealth
v. Barnhart, 22 D. R. 246, held that when a statute does not expressly
impose costs in addition to a fine they may not be assessed against
the defendant. Sec. 33, as amended, of the Act of June 14, 1923, P. L.
718 imposes a fine but says nothing of the costs. But Commonwealth
v. Evans, 59 Super. 607, 613 settled any uncertainty caused by this
lower court decision. The Evans case holds that defendants on con-
viction are liable for costs even tho not imposed by the statute
making the act an indictable crime or an offense tried summarily.
On acquittal may the costs be imposed on the defendant? Act
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of Sept. 23, 1791, 3 Sm. L. 37 forbade the assessing of costs on ac-
quitted persons. See Lehigh Co. v. Shock, 113 Pa. 373. In such a
case may the costs be placed on the county? The county is not
liable for costs in summary cases unless expressly made so by statute.
Dougherty v. Cumberland Co., 26 Super. 610. No statute has been
found placing the costs in such cases on either the county or state.
Hence we must decide that in case of acquittal, the Justice receives
no costs.
The case of Tumey v. Ohio, 47 U. S. Sup. Ct. 437 (1927) holds
that a mayor, who will receive no costs on acquittal, is pecuniarily
interested and a trial before him deprives the defendant of due
process of law. The judgment is legally unassailable and eminently
correct. The evils such a system has led to in this state are so
well known as to need no comment. The situation in the instant
case is identical with that in Tumey v. Ohio. Such an interest is
not insignificant but substantial and controlling.
It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Taft, the writer of
the opinion in Tumey v. Ohio, does not include Pennsylvania in the
list of states permitting this nefarious practice. He says, "In other
states, than those mentioned, (which does not include Pennsylvania),
the minor courts are paid for their services by the state or county
regardless of acquittal or conviction." We are unable to account
for this mistaken belief but as pointed out above, such is not the case.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. TENSION
Intoxicating Liquor-Seizure Under Defective Warrant-Entry of
Dwelling-Suppression of Evidence-Return of Liquor-
Act of March 27, 1923, P. L. 34
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petition of defendant for rule to show cause why search warrant
should not be quashed and all the evidence, secured by means of the
same, suppressed. He avers and it was admitted that the search
occurred in his dwelling house and that the officer making the com-
plaint as the basis for issuing the warrant had no knowledge or
evidence of any sale occurring on the premises. Commonwealth
contends that the petition is insufficient in not averring that the
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of Sept. 23, 1791, 3 Sm. L. 37 forbade the assessing of costs on ac-
quitted persons. See Lehigh Co. v. Shock, 113 Pa. 373. In such a
case may the costs be placed on the county? The county is not
liable for costs in summary cases unless expressly made so by statute.
Dougherty v. Cumberland Co., 26 Super. 610. No statute has been
found placing the costs in such cases on either the county or state.
Hence we must decide that in case of acquittal, the Justice receives
no costs.
The case of Tumey v. Ohio, 47 U. S. Sup. Ct. 437 (1927) holds
that a mayor, who will receive no costs on acquittal, is pecuniarily
interested and a trial before him deprives the defendant of due
process of law. The judgment is legally unassailable and eminently
correct. The evils such a system has led to in this state are so
well known as to need no comment. The situation in the instant
case is identical with that in Tumey v. Ohio. Such an interest is
not insignificant but substantial and controlling.
It is interesting to note that Chief Justice Taft, the writer of
the opinion in Tumey v. Ohio, does not include Pennsylvania in the
list of states permitting this nefarious practice. He says, "In other
states, than those mentioned, (which does not include Pennsylvania),
the minor courts are paid for their services by the state or county
regardless of acquittal or conviction." We are unable to account
for this mistaken belief but as pointed out above, such is not the case.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
COMMONWEALTH v. TENSION
Intoxicating Liquor-Seizure Under Defective Warrant-Entry of
Dwelling-Suppression of Evidence-Return of Liquor-
Act of March 27, 1923, P. L. 34
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petition of defendant for rule to show cause why search warrant
should not be quashed and all the evidence, secured by means of the
same, suppressed. He avers and it was admitted that the search
occurred in his dwelling house and that the officer making the com-
plaint as the basis for issuing the warrant had no knowledge or
evidence of any sale occurring on the premises. Commonwealth
contends that the petition is insufficient in not averring that the
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liquor was the lawful property of the petitioner or that seizure
adversely affected his interest.
Cutler, for Commonwealth.
Ferrarro, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Howley, J. These facts present two questions for decision. First,
whether or not the issuance of the search warrant was lawful?
Second, whether or not evidence secured by means of the same
should be suppressed?
As to the legality of the search warrant, we are guided in our
observations by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, which states that, "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches arfd seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things
to be seized."
Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of Pennsylvania has prac-
tically the same provision. It provides that the "people shall be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreaon-
able searches and seizures and no warrant, to search any place or
to seize any persons or things shall issue, without describing them
as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, subscribed to by affiant."
Probable cause deals with the affiant's belief based upon reason-
able grounds, and not with the guilt or innocence of the accused or
whether an offense has been committed in fact. (24 R. C. L. 707, Pp. 9).
Under the facts stated, the officer, therefore did not have prob-
able cause for causing the warrant to be issued.
Since the advent of the Prohibition Act, a Federal question, we
have had provisions made by the Pennsylvania Legislature concern-
ing the traffic in intoxicating liquors. The specific act is that of
March 27, 1923, P. L. 34. It states that the essential requirements
to obtain a search warrant in these cases, are that "the complain-
ants must allege, on oath or affirmation that there is probable cause
to believe, and that he has just and reasonable grounds for believing,
that intoxicating liquor is unlawfully manufactured, sold or possessed
in the place desired to be searched, (describing it), and the probable
cause for such belief must also be set forth in the complaint."
Section 8 of the same Act provides that "no search warrant
shall be issued to search any private dwelling, occupied as such,
unless it is being used in part-for some business purpose."
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A search warrant is improperly issued which fails to stricly
comply with the requirements of the above. It is therefore the
opinion of the court that the search warrant was illegal because it
was issued in violation of the above constitutional provisions and
the provisions of the Act of March 27, 1923.
Regarding the question whether or not evidence obtained by
a search warrant illegally issued should be suppressed, we find that
even though the search warrant was illegal, it does not follow that
evidence obtained by means of it should be suppressed. Common-
wealth v. Schwartz, 82 Superior 369; Commonwealth v. Ruben, 82
Superior 315.
Section 4 of the Act of March 27, 1923, states that, "proof
of possession of such intoxicating liquors shall be prima facie evi-
dence that same was acquired, possessed and used in violation of
the Act." This throws the burden of proof upon the defendant to
show that the liquor was lawfully possessed. We find the following
cases in point which hold that although intoxicating liquors had been
discovered under defective warrants it became the duty of the de-
fendant to show that he held the liquor lawfully and that no return
of the liquor would be made until the defendant clearly established
that the same was held lawfully, as provided by the Act. Common-
wealth v. Scanlon, 84 Superior 569: Commonwealth v. Premier Bev-
erage Co. 6 D. & C. 647; Commonwealth v. Dabberio, 7 D. & C. 622.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There can be no question that the search warrant in the instant
case was unlawfully issued. What effect has this on the property
seized under the warrant? The property so seized may be used as
evidence against the defendant and this notwithstanding the con-
stitutional immunity against forced self-testimony, Com. v. Dab-
bierio, 290 Pa. 174. Even tho the warrant was unlawfully possessed,
the possession would have the same character if the property were
returned and a legal warrant and reseizure could take place at once.
Com. v. Rubin, 82 Super. 315. In order to have the property re-
turned or the evidence suppressed there must be allegation and proof
that the property was lawfully possessed. Unlawfully possessed
liquor is contraband and there can be no property right therein.
In order to have a property right the defendant must prove lawful
possession. He has not done so and his rule is discharged. See
Com. v. Schwartz, 82 Super. 368 and Com. v. Donovan, IX Erie
County Law Journal, 206.
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COHEN v. PHILADELPHIA CHAIR COMPANY
Contract-Sale of Personal Property--Delivery of Possession-Act
of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Cohen and two others severally made contracts with the de-
fendant to purchase the supply of chairs which the company had
in its warehouse. Cohen paid the purchase price in full. The com-
pany and the other purchasers later selected the chairs to fill their
contracts, leaving only enough in the warehouse to fill Cohen's
order. The company became bankrupt and Cohen brings replevin
for the chairs, claiming an appropriation by exhaustion.
Goodman, for Plaintiff.
Groff, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Howley, J. The main question at issue is whether or not the
creditors of the vendor may treat the above sale as void, thus de-
feating an action of replevin.
In order to declaare such sale void the counsel for the defend-
ant relies, inter alia, upon Section 26 of the Uniform Sales Act as
adopted by Pennsylvania in the Act of May 19, 1915, P. L. 543.
This section informs us that "Where a person, having sold goods,
continues in possession of the goods, or of negotiable documents of
title to the goods, and such retention of possession is fraudulent in
fact, or is deemed fraudulent under any rule of law, a creditor or
creditors may treat the sale as void."
In other words, such a sale must be fraudulent per se, or, by
the particular rules of law in the state, it must be deemed fraud-
ulent; as ably pointed out by counsel for plaintiff, in such cases the
old law, prior to the passage of the act and the doctrines propounded
since its passage, governs.
From the facts, we cannot treat this sale as fraudulent per se;
and in order to ascertain whether or not it is to be fraudulent under
any rule of Pennsylvania law we must refer to the decisions of the
Pennsylvania courts.
In our search for precedent we find the case of Clow v. Woods,
5 S. & R. 275, which sets forth a general rule that "if a buyer pays
the price without taking possession of the goods, he takes the risk
of the integrity and insolvency of his vendor." This rule is affirmed
in the case of Babb v. Clemson, 10 S. & R. 419. This seems to be
the leading case. Since its decision it was cited and affirmed in
the case of Stephen v. Gifford, 137 Pa. 219.
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Later there seems to be a softening of the strict rule laid down
in the Clow case, supra, in the case of Keystone Watch Co. v. The
Bank, 194 Pa. 535, and also in the case of White v. Gunn, 205 Pa. 229,
which consider the hardships of such a stringent rule in certain busi-
ness transactions. In the Keystone Case, supra, the court held that
"actual transfer of possession is no longer necessary to effect a valid
sale, for the courts will always consider the nature of the transaction,
the relation of the parties and the object of the sale, in determining
the sufficiency of a constructive or symbolic delivery."
There is a good discussion of the rule in the case of Riggs v.
Bair, 214 Pa. 402, and most of the above cited cases are referred to
therein. It stands for the proposition that "the rule of law, that
a sale of personal property, without a delivery to the vendee, is a
fraud against creditors, is still the prevailing rule in Pennsylvania,
with the modification that in particular cases the law has been
reformed to meet the changed requirement of business." Thus the
rule of Clow v. Woods, supra, has been modified because of business
requirements. The Keystone case, supra, is not on all fours with
our present case, since the goods were held by an agent, of the
company, and there was a question of bailment and not of sale,
the bailment necessitated a possession by the bailee, and such
possession therefore was not deemed fraudulent.
Th Riggs case, supra, differs from our present case in that the
goods sold were placed in a separate pile with the vendee's name
and address attached thereto, and left there for convenience sake,
as was the custom of the trade. A similar state of facts is to be
found in the case of Rucker v. Spicer, 269 Pa. 451 and may be
likewise distinguished.
In the case of Enterprise W. Paper Co. v. Rantoul Co., 260 Pa.
540, the court held that unless there was actual delivery of the
goods, said goods on the Paper Company's premises, are liable to
seizure by execution creditors of the corporation, for the law will
not permit any devise to elude the principle which forbids a lien on
chattels or a security separate from their possession.
Thus we have the principle that if a buyer pays the price
without taking possession of his goods, he takes the risk of the
integrity and solvency of his vendor, with possible exceptions and
modification of business usages.
In the case before us for consideration, wherein has the plaintiff
done anything to circumvent this strict rule? No business usages
or customs have been stressed to change the rule. By his non-
feasance the goods were permitted to remain on defendant's premises.
The other two purchasers found time, and were diligent enough to
remove their chairs. Plaintiff did nothing to overcome the pre-
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sumption of fraud, and it is therefore the opinion of the court that
this retention of the goods by the vendor after the sale hhd been
made, was, under the law of Pennsylvania, fraudulent as to the
creditors of the company, and hence the action of replevin will
not lie.
Judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The first question that must be answered before the discussion of
the learned court below becomes relevant is whether there was such
an appropriation to the contract as would pass title to the pur-
chaser. The court beloW has failed to treat this question and its
failure to do so is inexplicable in the light of the given facts and of
plaintiff's argument. Unless title has passed, the second discussion
is entirely irrelevant for title remains in the Chair Co. and replevin
will not lie.
Was there an appropriation to the contract with the assent of
the buyer? There has been no express assent. But Cohen paid the
price in full in advance. Surely this is sufficient evidence of implied
assent to the appropriation in the absence of any other evidence.
But was there an appropriation by exhaustion? We think there was.
What more could the seller do to ascertain the goods? Would he
have to move them, label them or do some other specific act? There
remained no chairs but the ones needed to fill Cohen's contract.
Surely reason dictates that this was an unconditional appropriation.
We know of no argument or policy to constrain us to the opposite
holding. See Valentine v. Brown, 18 Pickering (Mass.) 549 and
Wait James v. Misland Bk., (1926) 31 Com. Cas. 172 (Eng.). Title
therefore passed to the buyer.
But may the retention of possession of the goods by the seller
be treated by the creditors as fraudulent and void? Undoubtedly it
could be so treated. The strict rule of Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R.
275 has been relaxed but not to the extent claimed by the plaintiff.
There must be some act evidencing an intention to pass possession
as well as title followed by some acts of the purchaser evidencing
ownership. Dunham, Inc. v. Van Orsdale, 82 Super. 72 Hunter
Const. Co. v. Lyms, 233 Pa. 561, and Northrop v. Finn Const. Co.,
260 Pa. 15. Where the vendor continues to all appearances to occupy
the same relation to the property as he did before the attempted
transfer, it is void as to creditors.
Bankruptcy has intervened here. What title does the trustee
get? Does he take it under these circumstances free of the claim
of the purchaser? Sec. 70 of the Bankruptcy Act provides "The
trustee shall be vested with the title of the brankrupt ... (5) to any
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property which prior to the filing of the petition . ..which might
have been levied on and sold under judicial process against him."
That in such a situation as this the trustee takes free of the claim of
the purchaser, see In Re Irwin, 268 Fed. 162.
Neither title nor right to possession being in the plaintiff, the
judgment must be for the defendant.
The judgment of the iearned court below is affirmed.
